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КИНО И РЕАЛЬНОСТЬ: ВПЕЧАТЛЕНИЕ ИЛИ ПЕРЕЖИВАНИЕ? 
В тексте рассматривается отказ современных режиссеров от кинематографа субъек-
тивной позиции и переход к феноменологической оптике. Классические теории 
кино (Ж.-Л. Бодри, В. Беньямин, К. Метц) описывают кинематографическое зрели-
ще как сложный результат «двойной объективации», формирующий особый режим 
веры-неверия. Именно этот парадоксальный режим позволяет зрителю получить в 
кинозале «впечатление реальности», что обеспечивается ритмом галлюцинаторного 
состояния/пробуждения. Современный кинематограф уже не ориентируется на оп-
позицию сновидение/бодрствование, разрушая границы этих понятий. Такие режис-
серы, как Б. Тарр, К. Рейгадас, К. Бовуа, А. Герман-ст., стремятся к воссозданию 
пространственно-временных характеристик реальности, настаивают на непосред-
ственном проживании онтологических обстоятельств того или иного события. Со-
временные исследователи кино полагают, что кинематографический опыт превра-
щается в переходное пространство, зону разрыва, где зритель не просто странствует 
в зеркальном лабиринте внутреннего и внешнего, образов и реальности, но осу-
ществляет акт мысли, формируя при этом саму свою способность мыслить.  
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CINEMA AND REALITY: «IMPRESSION» OR «EXPERIENCE» 
The text deals with the refusal of modern directors from cinema of a subjective position 
and the transition to phenomenological optics. Classical theories of cinema (J.-L. Baudry, 
V. Benjamin, K. Metz) describe the cinematographic spectacle as a complex result of 
«double objectification» that forms a special regime of faith-unfaith. It is this paradoxical 
mode that allows the viewer to get in the cinema a «impression of reality», which is en-
sured by the rhythm of the hallucinatory state / awakening. Modern cinema is no longer 
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guided by the dream / wake opposition, destroying the boundaries of these concepts. Such 
directors as B. Tarr, K. Reigadas, K. Beauvois, A. German-senior, strive to recreate the 
space-time characteristics of reality, insist on the ontological circumstances of this or that 
event. Modern film researchers believe that cinematic experience turns into a transitional 
space, a rupture zone, where the viewer not only wanders in the mirror labyrinth of the 
internal and external, images and reality, but performs the act of thought while forming its 
very ability to think.  
Keywords: cinema, reality, impression of reality, experience of reality, the openness, the 
habitation, Plato’s cave, revery, atonement, «apparatus for thinking thoughts», caesura  
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egies of philosophical analysis of cinematic experience»). 
 
When you pronounce the word existence, its strict philosophical meaning 
immediately flashes in the consciousness, and it may seem that we are going to 
speak about cinema as an existential experience. But no, it’s not about that. We 
are talking about a kind of prosaic and even technical meaning of the word exist-
ence, about the existence of cinematic matter, about trying to materialize the 
cinematic, substantivize it; trying to regard the cinema as a special material 
world, the sphere of factuality. Talking about cinema as an existence is possible 
in two paradigms – phenomenological and psychoanalytical ones. Phenomeno-
logical optics allows us to regard the cinema as a world that unfolds towards us. 
Phenomenology has one major requirement: not to take reality at face value, not 
to accept what is given to me for what really is. Despite the fact that the outlines 
of the outside world are distinct and do not cause me any doubt, the phenome-
nologists suggest «suspending» this world, disbelieving it, trying to see every 
thing anew. This requirement does not allow us to hurry – to perceive, under-
stand, make judgments. Phenomenology requires patience, the ability to endure 
uncertainty and meaninglessness. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, proposes to 
treat any event as an intersubjective one. A film can also be treated as an inter-
subjective encounter. Therefore, speaking of cinema, it makes sense to talk about 
a cinematic event, because the boundaries of the film can be quite uncertain. An 
event can last even when I leave the cinema and apparently don’t perceive any-
thing. Of course, when I talk about cinema in terms of existence, I do not dare to 
assert that this approach is universal, that the entire world cinema reveals this 
tendency. But I can definitely name several films which are its embodiment. 
These are films significant for modernity, films which it is impossible to ignore, 
to which you return again and again. They focus our reflection and require con-
stant revision. Among them are Carlos Reigadas’ Silent Light, «The Turin 
Horse» by Bela Tarr, «About People and Gods» by Xavier Bovois, «It is Diffi-
cult to Be a God» by Alexei German. In psychoanalysis universal judgments 
about mental reality are made on the basis of an encounter with one single per-
son, many encounters with one single person. This is a rule that can be extended 
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to the spectator practice. A single film may suffice to talk about the changes that 
take place in the whole cinema., I would like to elucidate the metamorphosis that 
occurs in these films by turning to a much earlier work of Georges Perek and 
Bernard Queysanne. Georges Perec, the author of the novels «Avoiding» and 
«Things», with Queysanne as the film director, shot a film after his own novel 
«The Man Who Sleeps». This film is a response to Marcel Proust. Proust's novel 
begins with the awakening of the hero. This is a novel about consciousness, 
about the experience of consciousness, and the fact that it begins with an awak-
ening is logical. Its hero slowly regains consciousness, and the way it happens is 
very important. The hero of Proust wakes up at different times, relating his body 
various rooms where he lived in different periods of his life. Following these 
attempts, we can hardly understand who is waking up and when, who is actually 
talking to us. Is it a young man who fantasizes about his life? A grown up person 
who remembers himself as a child? Or a man on his deathbed, who sums up his 
life recalling the past experience? Is it memory or exploration of life’s opportuni-
ties? As we read, it remains unclear to us. The uncertainty lasts until the awaken-
ing finally occurs. And in this awakening there is something mystical, mysteri-
ous. It took a whole novel to solve this riddle. We know that the novel of Proust 
becomes the emblem of the philosophy of consciousness and the literature of 
consciousness. The example of Proust allows us to talk about the subjective posi-
tion, about what can be considered as cinema and literature of the subjective po-
sition. It is significant that the language of cinema in its development is largely 
based on the subjective position. And in contrast with this absolutization of the 
subjective, Perek makes a film not about a person who wakes up, but about a 
person who falls asleep. Sleep is one of the main forms of inner experience, the 
space where a person leaves the outside world and sinks into himself. From the 
very start the cinema has been intimately related to the practice of dream. The 
metaphor of a dream is one of the main active metaphors of cinema, it deter-
mines its subjective quality. We are accustomed to the fact that a dream means a 
subjective camera, a subjective experience. But Perek and Queysanne give to this 
theme a completely different turn. Their film presents a very simple story, it is 
marked by pure mathematical minimalism and filmed with an objective camera. 
The very first frame, however, inspires us with a strange feeling that can be clari-
fied only by watching the film anew. We are told a story about a sleeping man 
who, being about to wake up, dreamed that he was already awake and was busy 
with his daily activities. In Freud’s «Interpretation of Dreams» there is a very 
similar episode about a certain Dr. Pepe, who dreamed that he woke up and went 
to work. This seems to mean that the editing sequence we are watching repre-
sents internal events; what the hero sees in a dream is a completely subjective 
experience. But no - we see installation shots where a young man in a room read-
ing a book or lying with his eyes closed alternates with real city footage: ped-
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dlers, cleaners, a neighbor in the corridor. All these do not make part of his 
dream, but are contemporary with it. But where does it all take place? Outside? 
Apparently yes, but in factit is not so. We can not qualify it as either internal or 
external world that surrounds the hero. But what about the editing sequence it-
self? Is it subjective or objective? Perek clearly shows us what it is. Hanging on 
the wall are pictures of Escher and Magritte. They tell us that in this case we 
cannot clearly distinguish the inside from the outside. The episode’s soundtrack 
underlines this uncertainty. When reviewing a fragment, we notice that even be-
fore we begin to see, we already hear. Here is a general plan of the city, but on 
the threshold of perception we begin to hear a measured knock, which turns out 
to be the sound of drops falling from a tap in the corridor. At some point, it turns 
into the sound of an alarm clock, and then a ticking of the clock in the classroom, 
where the exam takes place. The same sound unites several worlds. The world of 
the room where the hero lives, the corridor where the annoying neighbor lives, 
the world of the street and the university. These worlds are connected in dream 
reality. The hero reads a book, in whose title the words «daily life» are clearly 
distinguishable. These structures of daily life multiply infinitely in the film, over-
lapping each other, in accordance with the rules of Escher or Magritte. It seems 
to me that the thesis of this film is that the dream may not be an exclusively sub-
jective experience, which means that we have no reason to oppose the dream and 
real life so radically. This is a very important suspicion, because a lot has been 
built on this opposition in the theorie of the cinema. Perek and Queysanne’s film 
reveals one historically established spectator habit: we are used to the fact that in 
the cinema we are talking about ourselves.  
     In a wonderful book devoted to theories of cinema, T. Elsaesser and M. Ha-
gener say that the cinema as an institution not only developed itself, but also de-
veloped the viewer. As an audience, we have made a very long way. From a 
crowd in the cinema hall, we turned into people who idiosyncratic reactions to 
people who, sittin next to us, keep chewing popcorn. We have become extremely 
disciplined subjects who are scrutinizing and listening attentively to what is hap-
pening. What are we listening to and looking at? It is ourselves. Cinema is the 
practice of projecting our inner world on the screen. Initially, such projections 
are elementary, but with time they become deeper, thinner, and more sophisticat-
ed – as, for example, in Hitchcock, Lynch, Trier. The whole classical theory of 
the cinema is based on concepts that serve our subjective experience starting 
from early childhood. Trying to know into ourselves, to love ourselves, we turn 
to childhood. The cinematographic apparatus starts up regression, turning the 
motor response off. In the cinema, we are immersed in stillness, in a state which 
is neither sleep, nor wakefulness, it activates our ability to feel. The regressive 
process must be accompanied and completed by pleasure. This enjoyment is sim-
ilar to what we experience in a state of sleep. What Freud said about the dream, 
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corresponds to the cinematic practice. The dream serves to fulfill the desire. And 
so does cinema. But there is an additional complexity. Cinema has to enter into a 
relationship with reality, because a person comes to the cinema from the outside 
world and returns back to it. C. Metz describes how the knot of pleasure and re-
ality is formed. Cinematic convention is associated with a specific mode of faith. 
We simultaneously and absolutely believe and don’t believe in what is happen-
ing on the screen. This paradox is connected with the problem of absence. Cine-
ma, like photography, deals with absence. However, we do not feel this absence. 
On the contrary, we experience the film as a presence, we are actively hallucinat-
ing. But absence exists and works. It is through absence that the experience of 
intimacy arises. As Metz says, regression, pleasure and fetishization give rise to 
a kind of love for cinema which is intensly related to reality. We love movies 
which involve us in reality. We are wrong therefore, to consider cinema halls to 
be a zone of aesthetic emigration, this is not quite the case. According to the 
classics of the film theory, in the cinema we want to get an impression of reality, 
a hallucination of reality; they radicalize and sharpen our opposition to the 
world, intensify our subjective position. I watch movies and love movies because 
I prove to myself in this rather complicated way that I exist, enhance my ability 
to watch, see something, hallucinate.  
     It seems to me, however, that at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries, the cinema 
of the subjective position was gradually beginning to transform. It reflected 
changes that were taking place in the real world. Twin towers, terrorism, hybrid 
wars - all these events have changed the structure of everyday life. If you take 
any of these films («It’s Hard to Be a God,» «Of People and Gods,» or «Silent 
Light»), you cannot select a single privileged frame. All frames are usually 
marked, there is no single strong point, there is no moment of peripeteia. But 
then each frame is associated with each. They are all complexly correlated and 
intertwined with each other, so that not a single frame can be removed from the 
assembly whole. We can say that everyday life in these films plays a very special 
role. It forms the environment, shaping time and space. The impression of reality 
does not seem to be of interest to modern directors who are focused on the possi-
bility of experiencing reality. Cinema as an existence is opposed to the effects of 
reality that classical cinema has achieved. Now films do not help us to establish 
relationships with ourselves. My guess is that they establish relationships with 
others. 
      Changes in the external and internal relations imply a change in the role of 
the social context. For example, Xavier Beauvois’s film «On Men and Gods» is a 
film based on a true story that took place in the Algerian mountains. The film 
tells about a small monastery inhabited by eight French Christian monks. During 
the outbreak of a civil war, these monks were killed. Recently, there have been a 
number of such stories in the world and, of course, the mission of film directors 
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is to think about them. But the question is how they will do it. It is worth noting 
that Beauvois belongs to the wave of French directors who are known as aes-
thetes. How to understand this? Does a person living in an ―ivory tower‖ make a 
film about monks who died in Algeria? What is it? Did Beauvois really think it 
was time to leave the ebony tower? It is easy to imagine the positions from 
which such statements may be produced. The position of humanism, the criti-
cism of violence and cruelty, the conflict of the eastern and western world, the 
clash of different ideologies - these are the most common variants of «under-
standing» optics. This is a story told by someone tells to someone else, which 
means that the place of the narrator must be determined. Beauvois himself ex-
plains his motive in the following way - he says in an interview that he likes to 
make films about things that he does not understand. That is, he made the film 
precisely because he didn’t know how to talk about it, didn’t know how to start 
this story. And this was the reason for him to go in, get involved in this project, 
and realize it.  
      Watching «About People and Gods», we understand that this is a feature 
film, that there are actors on the screen, but the motive of non-fiction films is 
present all the time, although it seems to be unjustified. Why? Is it because we 
know that it is based on a real story? It seems to me that in this film, Xavier 
Beauvois is attacking classic cinema which tries to achieve the impression of 
reality. He does it in two ways. The first line of attack is the subject itself. What 
is happening here with the film character is rather curious: his inner world literal-
ly closes, as if his eyes were closed, as if a curtain fell over them, so that we no 
longer can know what is inside him.  
      This feature marks all the characters in these films - we do not know what is 
inside them. They can express emotions, behave like living people – it is their 
gaze that makes a problem. Everything seems to be the same, but is, in fact, 
completely different. We can no longer speak about the gaze in the Lacanian 
sense of the word, because it is no longer my own gaze returned to me by the 
mirror of the screen. This is a gaze coning from «the other side», the look of a 
«stranger». This is the first thing that happens – the closure of the character. All 
the characters are shut down, we can no longer penetrate into their inner world. 
One of the mechanisms about which J.-L. Baudry spoke, the mechanism on 
which the cinematographic apparatus is based, is violated – we cannot identify 
with the character. But after all, it was absolutely necessary for us to be involved 
in a psychological collision, in order to experience, in order to feel, in order to 
enjoy.  
      The Beauvois's film unfolds as a sort of decision story. On the one hand, the 
film has a plot, but it quickly recedes into the background and the action focuses 
on a certain synchronic moment – the need to make a decision. The circumstanc-
es of the story are as follows: a riot begins, gangs with traditionalist ideology 
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behave completely inadequately, kill all the foreigners, all those who have come 
to the region. They killed the Croats who came here to work, killed the girl on 
the bus who was not wearing a hijab, stabbing her in the heart and throwing her 
out of the bus. The administration of the region comes to the monastery and says 
to the monks say: «Leave, because we cannot ensure your safety». The eight 
monks, completely defenseless, have to make a decision: to leave or stay. That 
is, to close the monastery or to continue living there. I must say that they have 
lived there for a long time, the monastery was founded after the war, has existed 
for a long time and they have long been integrated into this village life. The 
monks help the locals – they treat them, although they have almost no medicines, 
they participate in festivals and rituals, that is, they live this life, produce some-
thing, sell it on the market, communicate with other faiths. And now everyone 
has to make the decision to leave or stay. Each of them has their own personal 
history, character, age, measure of responsibility, their own faith. In fact, the 
entire film focuses on this point in decision making. What will they say? 
Throughout the film, we are closely following the steps of this decision. And it 
turns out to be synchronic, despite all the deep differences that exist between 
these people. The ethical problem allows us to approach the experience of the 
real in a completely different way, that is, we are approaching reality not from 
the side of sheer impression, the persuasiveness of the real, but it seems to com-
pletely surround us, is just there as a kind of order. Almost the same happens in 
the movie «Silent Light,» where the same screened characters participate in a 
love story. We know that they experience extreme feelings and extreme events 
happen to them. But at the same time, we cannot identify ourselves with the he-
roes, nor share their feelings.  
      The second direction of attack on the impression of reality and the usual way 
of experiencing the film is related to the organization of the stage setting, to the 
way the frame is built. It seems to me that the understanding of space in modern 
cinema is becoming more and more close to what Heidegger called «the open-
ness». The ability or inability to stretch or spread out, openness and closeness, 
become the main characteristics of the film space. The action takes place in the 
forests, fields, or on the water, rather than in in the apartment or in the city. Why 
did the directors suddenly turn to the expanse and horizon? Because their charac-
ters, who live with their faces veiled, abide in the world. Whereas a man in a city 
is nothing else but an extension of himself. The city is too humanized a space. 
Benjamin wrote about this well in an article about Baudelaire, describing Paris 
itself as an extension of the poet’s body. But a person who lives in a forest can 
not pretend that it is his own. Under spacious skies a person is lonely and 
doomed to live and support his life all by himself. If, for example, the hero trav-
els, the way he brushes his teeth and makes tea becomes an event worthy of our 
atention. Within an open space actions tend to become repetitive. A person is 
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forced to move, to invent his daily routine. His daily kinestheses, small victories, 
attempts to inscribe himself in this space, to interact with infinity – this is not the 
perspective of a subjective position. In the open space, identification with the 
camera does not work very well, since the camera needs to understand the space 
as something finite, completed as a scene. Here we are talking about something 
else, about spatial identification. Heidegger calls it the habitation. We must be 
drawn into this world, get rawn into it kinesthetically, master its habituality, that 
is, form habits and develop habitual ways of acting. In the Beauvois's film, we 
accompany the characters in their daily activities – reading, praying, planting 
vegetables, talking to peasants, traveling to the market. We gradually get accus-
tomed to them. Knowing almost nothing about the personal history of each, we 
come eventually to know everyone, and by the end of the film we know so much 
that we cannot exclude any of them from ourselves. 
      Modern psychoanalysis offers us models that allow us to master these modi-
fications of the cinematographic experience. The most important of them is the 
model of «revery». The experience of revery's is derived from the dream experi-
ence. This concept was introduced by the English psychoanalyst W. R. Bion. 
Freud said that when we wake up, we cease to think like we did in a dream, and 
start to do it in a completely different way, that is, logically, clearly, rationally. 
Bion argues that dreaming thinking never stops. We never stop sleeping; sleep is 
the background and the foundation of our life. Those states, when we walk 
around the city, walk with open eyes - they can be called revéry. There is a very 
wide ange of such states, they are associated with the acceptance and digestion of 
what is difficult to accept and digest, usually with intolerable emotions and pain. 
The mechanism of «revery» is needed to somehow transform the very strong and 
problematic impressions that we get when confronted with reality. It seems to me 
that modern cinema, as well as Perek and Queysanne’s film, is focused on rev-
ery, rather than dreaming. The difference is quite significant: while the law of a 
dream is the fulfillment of a desire, the revery performs the setting. Bion uses the 
term atonement (reconciliation, settlement, redemption), writing it down with a 
hyphen (at-one-ment), and, thereby, making it mean «tuning to uniqueness». 
Reality as a state of affairs, and revery is trying to catch the tone of this reality. 
The dreaming machine, the «apparatus for thinking thoughts»,1 [1; p. 46] digests 
and thinks this reality. The moment of reduction to one, detection of intonation, 
determines the pulse of the reverie. This is a dream, but a very specific one. 
While the dream is based on projection, the revery, on the contrary, is based on 
introjection, on the fact that we place something inside ourselves: reverie has 
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spatial characteristics to it. We are offered mimetic practices for rendering the 
space habitable and acquiring habits: it is only through the seizure of habituality 
that we can achieve the co-tuning. There is a significant difference between the 
cinema which seeks to prove to itself its own existence (and this is possible in 
the feeling of pleasure), and the cinema as an attempt to enter into communica-
tion with reality. Revery experience is always «between». This is the transitional 
zone between me and the world, between me and the other. In this sense, cinema 
also becomes a transitional zone. Carla Ambrosia Garcia, working with the met-
aphor of the cave, notes the following: «The analogy appears to disregard the 
fact that the cinema is not a space in which the subject was born and has lived 
since, it is a spacethe subject goes to sometimes, or sometimes «creates» at home 
or in other spaces; whereas Plato believed most subjects have always lived in the 
cave and only the philosophers can go outside.»1 The cave of the cinema is such 
transition zone – the zone where we suffer transformation, where something 
happens to us, where we are can undergo a change. Bion calls this transition cae-
sura, that is, a gap and says that this is a gap that is overcome in an unknown 
way, a territory of formation. 
      And when Beauvois makes a film about people who have made a decision, 
one of the most powerful moments of this film becomes precisely the uncertain-
ty, that is, the fact that throughout the entire film the characters do not know 
what decision they are going to take. And this means that we also do not know 
what is going to happen to us, that is, what we are going to be like when we the 
movie is over. And this is what makes the experience of cinema into the experi-
ence of the real, the experience of a special transitional existence, the caesura 
which we constantly go through in order to change ourselves, in order to become 
different. Once more the cnema seriously claims to be something other than art. 
It seems that one of the main things that are essential for the cinema as a way of 
being is ontological trust. It is this trust that the directors want from us, and they 
are responsible for creating conditions for it. They want us not to believe the 
reality, but trust it. Just as we must at some point leave our subjective position in 
order to find ourselves in that small monastery, in the place and time where the 
heroes are located.  
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